Introduction

The doctrine of the Second Coming of Christ constitutes an axiomatic axis around which the Seventh-day Adventist Church constructs its theology.¹ Our church emerged as an eschatological movement, with a strong emphasis on the Second Coming.² However, more than 150 years after proclaiming the imminent coming of Jesus, we are still waiting for him. This “wait” has raised several questions among Adventists: Is there a “delay”? Can we hasten the second coming?

Several answers have been given to these questions.³ Some Adventists believe that Jesus has not come yet because he is waiting for his people to consecrate and testify diligently; that is, they believe that God’s people is responsible for the delay. In this sense, Herbert Douglass considers that the delay in the “harvest” of this world has not been caused by a change in God’s plans. On the contrary, if it were for God, the harvest would have taken place decades ago. According to Douglass, the delay has occurred because the fruit—the personal testimony that reproduces the character of Jesus in the people of God—has not yet matured.⁴

In contrast, Wallenkampf suggests that Jesus will return only when He decides it, and that there is nothing that can be done to hasten or delay the fixed time for His coming. He highlight the absolute sovereignty of God. His position is very clear: “Don’t for a moment think that you and I can change what has been fixed in God’s mind and plan.”⁵

Leroy Froom, on the other hand, attempted to explain the “delay” from the viewpoint of the conditionality of prophecies, and tried to harmonize the tension between imminence and delay.⁶ In this sense, Herbert E. Douglass—one of the main proponents of conditional prophecy—follows a similar approach.⁷

From dissimilar perspective, several authors affirm that the Second Coming can be hastened⁸ through the efforts of God’s people; either through the holy character of its members,⁹ the preaching of the gospel¹⁰ or simply highlighting the role that man can play to advance the Second Coming.¹¹

On the other hand, many theologians sustain that there can be no “delay” in God's plans: he has drawn a plan and there is nothing that can be done to hasten or delay that divine route.¹² In a similar way, Veloso claimed that there could be no delay, since the Bible nowhere sets a definite date for the return of Christ.¹³ On the other hand, some theologians sustain that God Himself is delaying His return, since He is waiting for the sinners to repent.¹⁴ And as a middle position, other authors try to keep the tension between imminence and delay.¹⁵

These opposing positions,¹⁶ notwithstanding, are based on the same texts of the Bible and Ellen White. In this line, a conflict of interpretations needs a hermeneutical analysis. A hermeneutical and methodological approach allows to perceive the reasons behind the opposing interpretations.¹⁷ Traditionally, hermeneutics has been associated with biblical interpretation. However, the act of understanding that is part of the theological elaboration goes beyond the interpretation of the text, and includes the cognitive process through which the theologians elaborate their conclusions and formulate their viewpoints.¹⁸

Canale borrows Hans Küng’s phraseology¹⁹ to classify paradigms in theology and applies it to hermeneutics: he mentions that there are three levels of hermeneutics: micro, meso and macro. Whereas microhermeutics refers to textual interpretation and mesohermeutic interpretation to doctrinal interpretation, macrohermeutics is related to the interpretation of the first principles, or presuppositions, within those that operate the doctrinal and textual interpretation.²⁰ A conflict of interpretations, then, needs to be addressed on a macrohermeneutical level too.

In this sense, God’s being is a foundational presupposition to analyze the different positions about the delay of the Second Coming. This presupposition determines the way theologians interpret God’s relation to the world and His creatures. That is, the answer to whether or not we can hasten the Second Coming depends fundamentally on the concept we have about God’s nature and the understanding of the way in which he decides to relate to the world. This vision determines how the biblical text is read and interpreted.

In order to analyze and evaluate the opposing views about the delay of the Second Coming, this paper presents: (1) a brief historical overview of the way in which God's being has been interpreted, emphasizing how this primordial presupposition affects theologians’ view of the relationship between God and the human being—specially God’s foreknowledge and providence; (2) Wallenkampf’s and Douglass’²¹ positions about the Second Coming, and their presuppositions about God’s foreknowledge and providence; (3) an evaluation of both positions; and (4) a working proposal about the delay/hasten of the Second Coming.

Classical Theology and Timelessness as Primordial Presupposition

Historically, the Being as primordial presupposition has been understood in two different ways—as timeless and as temporal. The first clear expression of timelessness as the basis of “ultimate” or “real” reality can be traced as far as Parmenides (c. 475 BC). He taught that reality was one and timeless,²² and he rejected the reality humans experience in time as not real or as a “second class” reality.²³ Notwithstanding, Plato (427-348 BC) was the first to express with clarity what philosophers mean by “timeless” reality when he describes the eternity of God in contrast with the temporality of creation.²⁴ In his book titled Timaeus, Plato argues that the divine being does not experience the future-present-past sequence of time.²⁵ In the same line, Aristotle developed his theory of a timeless and immaterial Being. According to him, Being’s reality is immutable—it involves no movement at all, and not even spatial movement that many other “eternal” beings have according to Aristotle. Due to its absolute immobility, Aristotle identifies his notion of Being as the "first unmoved mover."²⁶

When it comes to Christian theology, from very early in the history of Christian church, theologians decided to build its understanding of Christian doctrine from the plurality of sources of the methodological matrix. Among the sources included for theological use there was that of classical Greek philosophy predominantly. In this sense, H. P. Owen affirms that classical theism has a double origin, the Bible and Greek philosophy.²⁷ Augustine of Hippo was the first Christian theologian in developing an articulate body of doctrines based on the Bible and on the Greek philosophy. He took the Plato’s timelessness as primordial presuppositions to interpret God’s being. Accordingly, he was convinced that God cannot act in the future-present-past sequence of time—God is timeless.²⁸

Aquinas finally expanded the notion of the timeless Being as primordial presupposition. He applied it not only to God’s being, but also to the whole set of Christian beliefs. According to him, timelessness is the primordial presupposition to explain God´s being.²⁹ The importance of Thomas Aquinas’ thought to the theological formulation of the Christianity cannot be underestimated. The influence of the “Angelic Doctor” reaches not only to the Catholic Church´s theology,³⁰ but also a great share of the Protestant tradition,³¹ as in Calvin, for example.³² Even modern theologians, as the Evangelicals Millard Erickson³³ and Carl Henry³⁴—just to name a pair of examples—build their theology over this same primordial presupposition of timelessness to interpret God’s being.

What was the impact in classical theology of having adopted the timelessness of God as primordial presupposition? Reason not only needs presuppositions as starting point, but also its systematic character demands coherence between these presuppositions and other knowledge based on them.³⁵ Thus, the timelessness of God affected not only the interpretation of God’s being, but also this presupposition extended coherently to the understanding of His attributes and His relation to the world.

Consequently, for example, God was seen as totally immutable. God does not change in location, mind, knowledge, or actions. Augustine affirmed: “Whatever is changeable is not the most high God,”³⁶ and idea shared with Aquinas.³⁷ And very close to the concept of timelessness is the idea of God’s immateriality.³⁸ Therefore, since human beings’ world implies time and matter, God cannot share the same dimensionality of human beings. Even more, the concept of timelessness leads to the idea of impassibility: God cannot be affected by human being’s love.³⁹ God’s timelessness also affects the understanding of God’s foreknowledge and providence, which led to Augustine,⁴⁰ Aquinas,⁴¹ and finally Calvin⁴² to develop the concept of predestination. It is noteworthy to note, then, that timelessness of God affects God´s attributes and activities.⁴³

However, the primordial presupposition not only determines the outcomes of the theological-doctrinal configuration (meso-hermeneutic level), but also guides the task of the exegesis in the micro-hermeneutic level.⁴⁴ The systematic character of the reason’s structure demands that all new acquired knowledge agrees coherently with the adopted primordial presupposition about God’s being. In this way, in classical theology the exegetical task is also grounded in primordial presuppositions.

In the same line of thinking, Augustine established that an “ambiguous passage” in the Scripture must be read either literal or figuratively taking his “rule of faith”⁴⁵ as an ultimate hermeneutic key. According to him “whatever in the divine word cannot be referred to a noble end or to the truth of faith is to be taken as figurative, and the norm for this is the rule of faith.”⁴⁶ Augustine clearly builds his understanding of God on the timelessness of Being as a primordial presupposition. In this sense, all temporal and spatial allusions to God in Scriptures must be read as “metaphorical” ones, because they do not fit with his Greek idea of timeless, spaceless, immutable God:

But position, and condition, and places, and times, are not said to be in God properly, but metaphorically and through similitudes. For He is both said to dwell between the cherubims, which is spoken in respect to position; and to be covered with the deep as with a garment, which is said in respect to condition; and “Thy years shall have no end,” which is said in respect of time; and, “If I ascend up into heaven, Thou art there,” which is said in respect to place. And as respects action (or making), perhaps it may be said most truly of God alone, for God alone makes and Himself is not made. Nor is He liable to passions as far as belongs to that substance whereby He is God.⁴⁷

The same methodological supremacy of Being’s timelessness over the God’s self-understanding in Scriptures is found in Aquinas. When the Scriptures seem to deny his pre-adopted understanding of God as timeless, these passages have to be read as metaphorical ones. For example, to the objection against immutability based on Scriptures that God can change,⁴⁸ Aquinas opposes his argument that “these things are said of God in Scripture metaphorically.”⁴⁹

Calvin follows the same methodological procedure. Having adopted timelessness as a primordial presupposition, all biblical references that contradict timelessness and its associated concepts (immutability, spacelessness) have to be interpreted metaphorically.⁵⁰ This is clear when he addresses the issue of change in God:

When it is said that God repented of having made Saul king, the term change is used figuratively. Shortly after, it is added, “The Strength of Israel will not lie nor repent; for he is not a man, that he should repent” (1 Sam. 15:29). In these words, his immutability is plainly asserted without figure.⁵¹

Thus, the understanding of the attributes of God was molded and elaborated under the influence of Greek thought. God happened to be represented as an absolute, timeless and invariable being; a being that cannot be conditioned, impassive, with everything under its control.⁵² This understanding of God's immutability derives from the fact that neither divine knowledge nor divine will can change.⁵³ All thoughts of God are unmovable from eternity and He never can alter His will. If absolutely nothing changes in God, then the content of His knowledge and experience should never vary.

As for omniscience, God perceives all the past, the present and the future in a single timeless look. For Him, there is no past or future: only an eternal timeless present.⁵⁴ It is clear that in this vision of God, human beings can neither affect Him nor change His plans. In fact, he is so radically independent, that his knowledge of the world is not caused by the world. This would make God independent of creatures, something totally alien to the classical vision of God.⁵⁵ This concept of God, together with that of divine foreknowledge and providence expressed above, logically leads to a clear concept of predestination.⁵⁶

Eventually, Calvin presented His concept of double predestination taking to the extreme the logical consequences of adopting Greek timeless presupposition to speak about God’s being.⁵⁷ These notions—God’s timelessness, related to His foreknowledge and providence—lead to the determinism of future actions.⁵⁸ If the knowledge of God is invariable, the object of his knowledge must also be invariable. Therefore, reality is invariable. The future is fixed, closed.

Thus, during centuries, the understanding of God’s attributes of Classical Theism has been the mainstream trend in Christian theology.⁵⁹ RonaId Nash mentions that Classical Theism sustains eight core presuppositions about God’s being: “(1) pure actuality, (2) immutability, (3) impassibility, (4) timelessness, (5) simplicity, (6) necessity, (7) omniscience, and (8) omnipotence.”⁶⁰ God was perceived as an absolute, timelessness, spaceless, simple, and unchanging Being; a Being that cannot be conditioned, who has everything under His control.⁶¹ This understanding of God’s being dominated Christian theology during almost twenty centuries.⁶²

Wallenkampf and Douglass on the Timing of the Second Coming: A Brief Review of Their Hermeneutical Presuppositions and Methodology

In his work The Apparent Delay, Arnold Wallenkampf addresses the question of if it is possible to delay/hasten the Second Coming. In order to answer this question, Wallenkampf stresses the absolute sovereignty of God. His position is very clear: “Don’t for a moment think that you and I can change what has been fixed in God’s mind and plan.”⁶³ According to Wallenkampf, to say that God delayed His coming would be “bordering on blasphemy,” and “the very acme of arrogance” on the part of human beings.⁶⁴ In this view, there is no place for man’s activity in God’s plans, because “the task of giving the gospel to all the world is primarily God’s work.”⁶⁵ What are the hermeneutical presuppositions that are in the basis of this position?

Wallenkampf reveals his presuppositions in different sections of his book. In the chapter entitled “Time in God’s Eyes and Ours,” Wallenkampf express clearly that he is adopting timelessness as primordial ontological presupposition. According to him, “God is bigger than time. Time exists in Him rather than He living in time as we do.”⁶⁶ Although human beings fraction the time in tenses—past, present, future—it is “not so with God,” because He “lives in the eternal present.”⁶⁷ It is clear that Wallenkampf is working within a timelessness understanding for God’s being as primordial presupposition. His terminology and explanations are in the tradition of classical theism.

Since Wallenkampf interprets God’s being as timelessness, he also interprets the ultimate reality as timelessness. According to him, “time really does not pass—it stand still. The passing of time is only an illusion.”⁶⁸ Time, to him, “is a frame He established for Adam and Eve and their descendants to live in while they decided whether they would choose to be loyal to Him or not.”⁶⁹ And in order to be able to share the same dimensionality with God, “in the earth made new, time as we know it today will no longer exist.”⁷⁰ In other words, time is related to a sinful world, but ultimate reality is timeless.

As God’s being and the ultimate reality are timelessness, God’s knowledge is also timelessness. In this sense, Wallenkampf’s follow the traditional explanation of classical theism’s understanding of God knowledge. In Wallenkampf’s position, God knows the whole past, present, and future in a timelessness glance.⁷¹ Even more, as in classical theism, divine omniscience is equalized to an absolute divine providence. Since God is “both the originator and master of time, He sees all of it and controls it. Everything is under the ultimate mastery of the Infinite One.”⁷² In this sense, Wallenkampf seems to confuse omniscience with predestination.⁷³ Thus, Wallenkampf affirms that “God has timetables for both daily happenings and historical events.”⁷⁴ Here there is a fixed, closed, and invariable future, determined by the providence and omniscience of a timeless God.

The hypothetical and systematic character of reason’s structure lead Wallenkampf to interpret the biblical text in a coherent way with his adopted primordial presuppositions about God’s being. In this way, for example, he interprets Eph 2:4-6: “But God […] made us sit with him in the heavenly places in Christ Jesus,” as if “already, or now, He [God] sees ‘us sit together in the heavenly places in Christ Jesus.’ ”⁷⁵ The clear past tense of the text (συνεκάθισεν, aoristo, activo) is interpreted by Wallenkampf as an timeless present. Other texts interpreted by Wallenkampf as if they were referring to God’s timelessness are 2 Peter 3:8, and Psalm 90:4.⁷⁶ Thus, the adoption of timelessness as primordial presupposition to understand God’s being lead to Wallenkampf to interpret the biblical text in a coherent way with this presupposition. Next section presents a theological evaluation of some aspects of Wallenkampf’s position.

Opposite to Wallenkampf, Herbert Douglass considers that there has truly been a delay. This delay in the “harvest” of this world is related to the failure of God’s people. If it were for God, the harvest would have taken place decades ago. The delay has occurred because the fruit, the personal testimony that reproduces the character of Jesus in the people of God, has not yet matured. This position is based on the quote from Ellen White:

Christ is waiting with longing desire for the manifestation of Himself in His church. When the character of Christ shall be perfectly reproduced in His people, then He will come to claim them as His own.
It is the privilege of every Christian not only to look for but to hasten the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ (2 Peter 3:12). Were all who profess His name bearing fruit to His glory, how quickly the whole world would be sown with the seed of the gospel. Quickly the last great harvest would be ripened, and Christ would come to gather the precious grain.⁷⁷

This understanding is based on the principle of conditionality of prophecy. God will wait until the maturity of Christian character manifests itself in a good number of people. This is the great condition that determines the events that will trigger the Second Coming. The eschaton would be conditioned by the state of the church. Clearly, the emphasis here is on human action.

Douglass departs from different presuppositions regarding the relationship that God establishes with his creatures. He mentions that although God will fulfill what he has promised (the second coming), often He must wait for his purposes to be reached by men and women who have freedom of choice.⁷⁸ Douglass does not elaborate his concept about God’s foreknowledge and providence. He only affirms God's foreknowledge of all future events. As for the concept of providence, he believes that the principle of the harvest does not limit in any way the sovereignty of God. It only shows that God is a patient, merciful and forgiving Sovereign. God is waiting for his people to reveal a character similar to that of their Creator.⁷⁹

Brief Evaluation of Both Positions

This section presents a brief evaluation of Wallenkampf’s and Douglass’ positions.⁸⁰ Wallenkampf’s ontological presuppositions are very similar to that of Classical Theism. From this point of view, Wade has criticized Wallenkampf’s position because it is based “in Greek philosophy.”⁸¹ In this sense, Wade affirms that “Seventh-day Adventists who reject Plato's anthropology should also reject a theology that is based on his ideas.”⁸²

These adopted presuppositions of Greek timelessness to understand God’s being lead to Wallenkampf to interpret also as timelessness some biblical reference to God’s time. He also has a strong view of divine omniscience and providence. Although Wallenkampf affirms to believe in human freedom,⁸³ his concept of divine omniscience leads him to a semi-predestinatory view of future, where foreknowledge implies predestination: “He [God] sees all of it and [therefore] controls it. Everything is under the ultimate mastery of the Infinite One.”⁸⁴

Thus, Wallenkampf falls in the same theological determinism of classical theism, in which God’s complete knowledge of the world in a timeless glance becomes an a priori condition to which all events must correspond strictly.⁸⁵ In this view, what God foreknows must be necessarily predetermined for Him.⁸⁶ That is, the Second Coming has to happen because God foreknew it in His omniscience. This is a fixed view of the future, determined by the omniscience of a timeless God. Wallenkampf's stance follows the same pattern of Classical Theism: the adoption of timelessness to explain God’s beings leads him to a conception of divine omniscience in which the constitutive elements of timelessness and vision end in a determinist conception of history, in which God decides and carries out his plan of salvation, and human beings cannot either delay or collaborate to the advancement of God’s plans.

Unlike Wallenkampf, who maintains that God is the only active agent, the emphasis in Douglass is placed on man’s response: “God does expect perfection of character in His people—a demonstration that some generation of latter-day Christians will reveal before Jesus returns.”⁸⁷ One of Douglass’ key concepts regarding to divine providence stems from his understanding of the principle of conditionality of prophecy. According to this principle, all promises are conditional on certain clauses being fulfilled, even if they are not explicitly declared, as happened in the incident of Jonah’s preaching in Nineveh. In this sense, God will wait until the maturity of Christian character manifests in a good number of people. This is the main clause that determines the events that will unleash the Second Coming.

Thus, Douglas presupposes God’s intervention in human history—and human time—and, therefore, he does not see a conflict between divine omniscience and providence, human beings’ free will. We sustains that often, God must wait until His purposes is carried out by men and women who have free will, because that is precisely what the great controversy is about.⁸⁸

The concept of the conditionality of prophecy, together with the defense of free will and the temporality of God, put Douglass in tune with the biblical presupposition of divine providence. The Scriptures understand that God governs history historically. This means that God does not govern by eternal decrees that determine the course of human history. On the contrary, the biblical picture of God’s providence shows that God carries out his plans within the limitations and complexities of human history. In this sense, salvation develops within the risk and contingency that characterizes creation, which in turn includes human free will.

Some have criticized Douglass, however, for building his entire theology from Christology, anthropology and soteriology.⁸⁹ By having the humanity of Jesus as the center of his soteriology, and considering that the human being can become perfect like Jesus, Douglass arrives at eschatology: God will wait until a considerable number of Christians develop a character equal to that of Christ before coming for the second time. Precisely, its Christological and soteriological position conditions its eschatological vision.

Beyond the fact that several theologians have recognized the lack of biblical support for the theories of the fallen nature of Christ and of sinless human perfection,⁹⁰ by jumping from Christology and soteriology to eschatology, Douglass seems to neglect some key presuppositions to approach the Second Coming, such as God’s providence. In this sense, Douglass seems to dismiss all the other factors that must occur concomitantly before the second coming. Douglass seems to have a mono-conditional view of providence. According to him, the only detonator of the second coming is the person of God, when faithfully reflects the character of Christ. He does not have an integral vision of divine providence, but he emphasizes only God’s people state. It even goes so far as to affirm that Christ’s work of purification in the sanctuary will be done only when His people in the time of the end reach the state of perfection in the likeness of Christ.

In this sense, Douglass does not follow the systematic nature of knowledge. The systematic nature of knowledge requires coherence between the contents. Theological constructions do not work without presuppositions. Now, from them, the reason consistently extracts new knowledge. The presuppositions guide and support all rational theological activity. All new knowledge is consistent with the presuppositions and the set of knowledge that is already possessed. In other words, reason demands that, in all areas, the new theological positions cannot be in contradiction with the fundamental theological premises that have already been adopted. This means that human knowledge is a systematic structure formed by presuppositions and consequences derived from them in a coherent way.

As mentioned, Douglass does not seem to follow the systematic character of knowledge. Instead of setting out the biblical presuppositions for a correct understanding of eschatology, he bases his position about the delay of the Second Coming solely on his Christological, anthropological and soteriological presuppositions, but he does not take into account all the dimensions of divine providence.

Moreover, he does not realize that the issue of delay belongs to the level of providence, not to that of Christology, anthropology or soteriology—all are included within the general framework of the providence. He has the biblical presupposition of divine providence as a frame of reference, but he does not elaborate his position from them, following the systematic character of knowledge, and therefore neglect important aspects of divine providence that play an important role in the time of the end, in relation to the issue of Second Coming he is addressing.

From a methodological and hermeneutical viewpoint, then, Wallenkampf adopts extra biblical presuppositions regarding God’s being, foreknowledge and providence, while Douglass jumps directly from Christology to Eschatology, without analyzing the role divine providence plays in his position about the delay of the Second Coming.

A Working Proposal

Only a few ideas will be presented in this section that will attempt to suggest a more biblical framework for thinking about God and his relationship to the world—that is, the biblical presuppositions about God’s being, foreknowledge and providence.

In firs place, Scripture mentions that the source of information about God is His own revelation (Heb 1: 1-3). Therefore, the understanding of God’s eternity must depart from the Scriptures themselves. The words that are commonly translated as “eternity” in the biblical record ('ôlam in the Old Testament and aion in the New Testament) have a clear temporal meaning, basically to a limited or unlimited period of time. It should be clarified, however that if God’s eternity is conceived in temporal terms, it does not mean that the Bible identifies it with the created time that human beings experience as a limit of their finite being. God experiences time in a qualitatively different way from man, not in that He denies time, but in that He integrates and surpasses it (Ps 103: 15-17, Job 36:26). This temporal vision of God considers that He can relate directly and personally to man within human history, in such a way that both God and human beings share the same history.

In the classical theology, immutability refers to the absence of change in God. In fact, the Bible itself declares that God does not change (Mal 3:16, Stg 1:17), but classical theism has identified this immutability as impassibility. This position considers that God has a static life in which relationships, new experiences, emotions and change are excluded. God is not related to history and human experiences. On the other hand, the biblical perception, interpreted within the historical framework provided by the great conflict between Christ and Satan, and the real and historical incarnation of Jesus, shows that God experiences emotions (Ex 34:14; Nm 11:33), relationships ( Lev 26:12) and even change of plans (Ex 32:14).

According to the Bible, God’s knowledge is perfect (Job 37:16), and this knowledge should not be identified with his omnipotence. Foreknowledge refers to God’s ability to include in his omniscience not only past and present realities, but also future ones, even the free actions of men and women (Acts 2:23; Rom 8:29; 11:2). God's foreknowledge is neither contradictory nor logically incompatible with human freedom. Those who perceive an insurmountable contradiction between them, implicitly assume that God knows in the same way that we do.

Scriptures does not identify predestination with foreknowledge, where God would predestinate everything he knows. God does not predetermine human destiny. Paul clearly distinguishes between foreknowledge and predestination (Rom 8:29). In this vision, the destiny of the human being not only implies the plan and works of salvation, but also the free response of faith to the call of the Holy Spirit.

In relation to providence, Paul differentiates foreknowledge, predestination and providence (Rm 8:28). This differentiation highlights the fact that God does not control human history in the sense that He plans and executes everything that happens in it. Rather, God relates personally and guides human history toward its goal. In addition, the Scriptures present that human nature was designed by God with two fundamental characteristics: freedom and self-determination. From this it follows that God does not force or control human beings, much less the entire course of history.

God's goals in history are not achieved by forcing human freedom—because force is not only incompatible with freedom but also with love. On the contrary, by participating actively in history, God works for salvation on different levels: the individual, the social and the cosmic. Within the framework of temporality—which implies contingency—the results are not predetermined. However, there is not uncertainty about the future destiny of history. God’s foreknowledge gives certainty about the future.

According to the Scriptures, then, God guides human history personally within the flow and complexity of it and not from heaven by means of eternal and irresistible decrees. In turn, a conception of divine providence must also find its meaning within a structure of temporal historical significance: God decides to work temporarily in history through his church and in cooperation with her. Thus, the mission of the church has its roots in the history of salvation and in the process of redemption, since the history of salvation is nothing more than redemption itself in its temporal historical development.

Thus, besides the concept of divine foreknowledge and providence, it must be recognized that God decides to work together with human beings, within human history, to achieve some of His purposes. In this sense, there are some objectives that must be fulfilled in relation to the Second Coming in which God has decided to work in cooperation with the human being. A biblical position about the delay/hasten of the Second Coming, then, needs to take account of these presuppositions about God’s foreknowledge and providence.